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A short psychosocial history of British child abuse and protection: case 






This paper offers a historical and psychosocial account of ‘moral panics’ about 
child maltreatment in England over the last four decades, and proposes this 
perspective as additional to Eileen Munro’s more systemic account of the 
same history. The formal child protection system is theorised in terms of an 
explicit and a covert dual primary task. The overt task is to actually protect 
vulnerable children and prevent abuse; the covert task is to protect the 
remainder of society from exposure to anxiety provoking ‘dangerous 
knowledge’ about the prevalence of child maltreatment. Episodes of public 
and political moral panic occur when the boundaries of containment provided 
by the official system and its processes are breached, propelling debate and 
contestation about child maltreatment into the public sphere, where public 
enquiries and other social mechanisms are called upon to ‘settle’ the 
contested issues. Sometimes these social settlements appear to be 
successful in resolving conflicts about the reality or otherwise of specific forms 
of abuse; in other cases, especially child deaths, the controversial and anxiety 
laden-nature of the problem is recurrently projected back into the public 
domain. The paper suggests that this may be associated with a difficulty 
about establishing a secure symbolic framework or discourse in society for the 
emotionally indigestible facts of child torture and murder . In turn this may be 
associated with problems about the decline of public mourning rituals, and the 
failure of the public enquiry format to facilitate this. In line with Munro, the 
paper argues for the importance of a tragic perspective on child maltreatment, 
to counter idealisations of the capacity of the formal system to protect 




If we step back and try to understand, as a total situation, the phenomenon of 
child maltreatment and child protection work in England in the 21st century 
then what do we see? Self-evidently, we are confronted with a cultural and 
political phenomenon and not just a professional, legal, familial or social 
scientific one. In this sense child abuse and protection are not unique. Other 
practices addressed to difficult human predicaments, and which were once 
largely the preserve of specialised professional, legal and scientific systems, 
have escaped the boundaries of these same systems and become a focus of 
intense public, political and cultural debate and anxiety. Autism and its 
putative link to the MMR vaccine is one instance. Human embryo research 
and the ethics of human tissue preservation are another. In all such cases 
where professional and scientific practices are suddenly propelled into the 
turbulence of the public sphere, the consequences for practitioners, for the 
ethics of professional conduct, and for research method itself are surely acute 
and often irreversible. Following a public crisis of these kinds in the domain of 
practice concerned, things are never the same again.  
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Eileen Munro’s series of reports (Munro 2010, 2011a, 2011b) into the British 
child protection system and the reforms she proposed, relied heavily on a 
systemic analysis of both the problems and solutions. Her arguments are 
detailed, rigorous, well evidenced and persuasive, and at the time of writing 
have undoubtedly led to an improved climate for child protection work in 
Britain. In the context of the historical perspective taken in the present paper, 
her explanation of the repetitive public crises afflicting the system is 
interesting:  
 
When society was outraged by the death of Maria Colwell and the 
series of high profile cases through the 1970s and 1980s, professionals 
responded by gradually lowering the threshold for intervention to 
minimise the chances of missing another child in such extreme danger. 
This necessarily led to more families with low actual levels of abuse 
being caught up in the net. The cases of Cleveland and Orkney were 
unsurprising consequences: on these occasions, professionals were 
criticised for intervening inappropriately and removing large numbers of 
children from their homes unnecessarily.(Munro, 2010, p. 23) 
 
This is one instance among many she offers of the operation of the law of 
unintended consequences in systems, and her she deploys it to account for 
the episodic recurrence of child protection crises in the public sphere.  
 
My own perspective in this paper is different, but not in contradiction with 
Munro’s. Its main themes concern processes, through extended periods of 
time, of apparent social, professional and intellectual resolution of key 
conflicts and debates about the nature and existence of some categories of 
child maltreatment; and processes of irresolution and repetition in relation to 
some other categories of child abuse. In some instances, the central 
controversy and the attendant public anxiety and entanglement with this is, as 
it were, laid to rest. In others it keeps coming back to life. I characterise these 
processes in terms of a philosophical public dialogue between the specialised 
professional systems of child protection and the wider public sphere. I then 
enquire into some explanations for those categories of abuse that refuse to be 
put to rest, and suggest that these have much to do with issues about the 
handling of death and mourning in the contemporary public and private 
spheres. Finally, I offer some thoughts about the connection between these 
events and the role of myth and myth-making in sustaining our social capacity 
to process profound existential dilemmas. The paper falls into three main 
parts that more or less correspond to these themes.   
 
In the few years since the publication of Munro’s reports, there has not been a 
recurrence of the kind of moral panic that attended the deaths of Victoria 
Climbié or Peter Connelly. Has there been a decisive shift in public and 
political mood, an acceptance that ‘mistakes will sometimes happen’ and that 
as Munro puts it ‘prediction and prevention of child maltreatment is 
necessarily a fallible process’ (2011a, p. 96), thus lowering the temperature in 
the public sphere sufficiently to avoid the need for further eruptions of public 





Despite the parallels with episodes of public turbulence and scrutiny of 
specialised professional practices in other domains, I believe that this wider 
cultural history of English child maltreatment and protection and its 
consequences for everyday practice is distinctive and probably unique.  I want 
to suggest that child protection controversies constitute a ‘limit case’ of the 
processes I have alluded to above and that careful analysis of the complex 
dynamics involved may yield findings of much wider social significance.  
 
The two tasks 
 
What is a system of child protection for? What is a system for the protection of 
any group of vulnerable people for? I want to propose that it has at least two 
primary tasks, but that the tension between these can be a source of acute 
difficulties, and that in the English child protection system this tension lies at 
the heart of a real crisis. The crisis takes the form of a paradox or 
contradiction, in fact a number of paradoxes. On many indices, including 
international comparisons, the system does quite well at protecting children 
from extreme and life threatening abuse and violence. Research by Colin 
Pritchard and Richard Williams (2010) suggests that child abuse related 
deaths in the UK have been declining steadily for the last 30 years, and at a 
significantly higher rate of decline than all causes of child death. But the 
experience of those working in the system is different – from the perspective 
of front line workers, and their managers it is teetering on the brink of 
collapse, hanging on by its fingernails. And this experience has been getting 
steadily worse. Why is this?  
 
In the week when the ‘Baby P’ crisis was at its height in 2010, I wrote an 
article in a national newspaper and found myself engaged in a number of 
media appearances as a result. The most intelligent conversation I felt I had 
all week was with a London cab driver as I was on my way to a radio 
interview. I was apprehensive about his reaction when I told him what I was 
about to do – London cabbies not being especially well known for their liberal 
views. But he said, ‘I can’t read about that case in the papers – it’s too 
distressing…I couldn’t do that job, I wouldn’t be able to sleep at night’. He 
laughed a little nervously and looked at me in the mirror, and said ‘I suppose I 
wouldn’t have been a very good social worker’. But he had his finger on 
something important - one thing social workers and others in the child 
protection system do at a societal level is help people sleep at night; not 
because we are defending the realm against communists, terrorists or 
insurgents, but because we are protecting people from the emotional impact 
of knowing about the torture and murder of babies that may be happening just 
down the street from where each of us lives.  
 
Thus my hypothesis is that the covert or unconscious primary task of the child 
protection system is to manage, on behalf of the rest of adult society, our 
deep ambivalence about children, about parenting, and about the propensity 
in all of us to feel like doing violence towards our own children; in other words 
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the ubiquity of hatred within the ordinary, everyday job of parenting. This is a 
largely unacknowledged reality in our society, and  a difficult one to ‘evidence’ 
Here I offer just one or two morsels starting with a few lines from the novelist 
Rachel Cusk’s (2002) uncomfortably honest book about her experience of 
motherhood:  
 
Looking after children is a low status occupation. It is isolating, 
frequently boring, relentlessly demanding and exhausting. It erodes 
your self esteem and your membership of the adult world. The more it 
is separated from the rest of life, the harder it gets…As a mother you 
learn what it is to be both martyr and devil. In motherhood I have 
experienced myself as both more virtuous and more terrible, and more 
implicated too in the world’s virtue and terror, than I would from the 
anonymity of childlessness have thought possible. 
 
(Cusk R., 2002: 7-8)  
 
However, for a significant proportion of the population official or media 
recognition of child maltreatment will not be functioning as a vehicle to 
assuage conscious or unconscious anxieties or fears (It’s OK, the real 
abusers are over there and being dealt with by those social workers), but as a 
representation of real experiences of abuse, known to them, but not disclosed 
or investigated, and hence beneath the surface of public awareness. How 
come?  
 
Child maltreatment remains a major public-health and social-welfare 
problem in high-income countries. Every year, about 4–16% of children 
are physically abused and one in ten is neglected or psychologically 
abused. During childhood, between 5% and 10% of girls and up to 5% 
of boys are exposed to penetrative sexual abuse, and up to three times 
this number are exposed to any type of sexual abuse. However, official 
rates for substantiated child maltreatment indicate less than a tenth of 
this burden. 
 
(Gilbert et al. 2008, p. 1)  
 
So, up to ten times the amount of child abuse ever reported or investigated in 
Britain is lurking somewhere just beneath public, judicial, community, or 
professional awareness. What might be the contribution of the population of 
abusing adults, and young people, as well as unidentified victims of abuse to 
eruptions of public outrage and anxiety when a child abuse case hits the 
headlines? In her psychoanalytic study of the Paulsgrove Estate anti-
paedophile vigilante movement, Jessica Evans (2003) reveals that a high 
proportion of the women who whipped up the campaign against a fantasised 
‘list’ of locally resident paedophiles were themselves well known to children’s 
services because of child care concerns.  
 
The women made definite secondary gains from putting themselves in 
the position of the persecuted, once they had projected all the 
destructiveness onto the paedophile other. Strengthened by the group, 
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individuals achieved a position of moral rectitude that left them feeling 
omnipotent, and in control.  
(Evans, 2003: 177) 
 
If we extend the principles of this analysis, then a second unacknowledged 
primary task of the child protection system is not just to be a container for 
universal anxieties and ambivalence of the kind that Rachel Cusk gives voice 
to, but as a site for the collective projection of denial about actual abuse that 
goes unreported or un-investigated.  
 
Truth, knowledge and fantasy: a social dialogue 
(a) The Cleveland Crisis 
 
I suggest that each time society is confronted anew with awareness of 
something like the actual prevalence of abuse in its midst, the impact of this 
new knowledge is traumatic in some meaningful sense of that rather abused 
word. Of course the truly traumatic events – such as the widespread intra-
familial sexual abuse of children – have already occurred; but our collective 
capacity to tolerate knowing about this may not be securely established; so 
much so that there may not even be a language, an available conceptual 
apparatus or discourse with which individuals or society can think about such 
matters. A kind of social repression barrier is operating.  
 
I suggested earlier that the consequences of repeated explosions of public 
and political concern about single cases of child abuse or death have been 
negative for the capacity of the professional system to function. But there is 
another side to the story. In diagram 1, I represent what I see as certain very 
turbulent, but positive processes in which the specialised system of child 
protection was pressed into a complex philosophical dialogue with the 
remainder of society.  The Cleveland crisis of 1987 is the first example. With 
Cleveland there really was a world before and a world after. In the course of a 
few turbulent months as the extraordinary events in Cleveland unfolded, our 
world changed, and changed I believe decisively for the better. The fact of 
widespread intra-familial sexual abuse in our society became established, 
accepted. But not without a tremendous struggle; I think it is easy to forget 
how ill equipped we were in 1987 as a society and as individuals to cope with 
the emergence into social awareness of this most disturbing of social facts. In 
retrospect it can seem as though a capacity to tolerate painful and unwelcome 
truths won out in a contest with the impulse to deny them, and to label the 
truth seekers mad. While this is accurate, and that this was a crisis in which 
an opportunity for civilised progress was seized, I also believe we forget that 
at the time most of us were truly uncertain about the status of the disclosures 
and revelations which were emerging. Sexual abuse as a widespread social 




The two systems and the public sphere as a process of 
































However, I believe that Cleveland became a social ‘crisis’ not just because 
new and disturbing facts were emerging into the daylight, but also because 
these ‘facts’ sometimes transpire to be inherently uncertain in their nature, 
independently of  any social, political, ideological or organisational pressure 
brought to bear by interested parties in the context of their emergence. In 
certain circumstances in sexual abuse, no-one, not even the victim, may be 
sure ‘what happened’. This fact – the fact of inherent possible indeterminacy 
or undecidability with respect to historical truths about abuse seems to me to 
be an important but under-recognised component in the construction of the 
crisis. We like to, or even need, to have a sense of certainty about such 
profound matters. True, false, it happened, it didn’t happen. It may be true, as 
Freud claimed, that the incest taboo is the foundation stone of civilisation, 
securing the boundary between reality based and fantasy based social and 
psychological functioning, but it then follows that where this boundary has 
been violated, something fundamental about our grip on the epistemological 
foundations of civilisation will be compromised. This is a pretty frightening 
discovery. The predicament is alluded to in the report of the public inquiry into 
the Cleveland affair:  
 
The concept of helping the child to tell (of sexual abuse) is recognised to 
have its uses in certain circumstances. When embarking on it for 
diagnostic purposes, it is important to remember at least three possible 
situations: 
 
1. The abuse has occurred and the child is speaking of it. 
2. The abuse has occurred and the child is unable to speak of it or is 
denying it. 
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3. The abuse has not occurred, and the child cannot speak of it. 
 
It is clearly a difficult matter of judgement to know whether the child is 
not telling because of some sort of pressure, such as fear of the 
consequences, or because there is nothing to tell. At the end of a 
session, the professionals may not know which of those two situations 
is the true position.  
 
(HMSO, 1988, pp 206-207) 
 
However, after a period of testing in the public domain, in the courts and the 
inquiry process itself, something like a ‘true’ overall position was settled upon. 
A large majority of cases of suspected sexual abuse were deemed to have 
been based in some reality. The Butler Sloss enquiry effectively ‘settled’ the 
contest about whether intra-familial sexual abuse was a ‘fantasy’ or a ‘reality’ 
and there has been no subsequent publicly endorsed effort to overturn this 
‘settlement’. 
 
(b) Satanic Abuse 
 
The second episode concerns what became known as ‘Satanic abuse’.  This, 
as some may recall was one dimension of the Orkneys crisis, but there were 
other sites of alleged exposure of Satanic abuse – especially in Rochdale and 
Nottingham. If the fact, the existence or otherwise, of child sexual abuse was 
temporarily and fiercely contested during the Cleveland affair, then the 
Satanic abuse disclosures led to even more controversial contestations. 
Broadly, and I suspect correctly, the weight of official evidence and opinion 
eventually settled on a judgement that the most extreme features of 
allegations of Satanic abuse were a kind of hysteria or group fantasy; but 
along the way, some careful distinctions were established – the evidence for 
ritual abuse, and systems of organised child abuse became better accepted 
and understood, but the more lurid allegations associated with Satanic abuse 
– sacrificial baby murder, cannibalism, drinking the blood of murdered children 
- were rejected. In thorough international studies not a single shred of forensic 
evidence was discovered to support these claims. There are some pretty 
respectable child mental health professionals who would dispute this outcome 
even today. Who is actually right, if there is an absolute right and wrong in this 
very murky area, is a matter of great importance. But in this paper I am more 
interested in describing the rather unusual processes via which the questions 
involved are ‘tested’.  
 
To give us a flavour of where the controversy came to rest here is one of the 
conclusions of Jean La Fontaine’s research study, commissioned by 
government to try to investigate the allegations and settle the debate:  
 
3.  Rites that allegedly include the torture and sexual abuse of children 
and adults, forced abortion and human sacrifice, cannibalism and 
bestiality may be labelled satanic or Satanist. Their defining 
characteristic is that the sexual and physical abuse of children is 
part of rites directed to a magical or religious objective. There is 
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no evidence that these have taken place in any of the 84 cases 
studied. (original emphasis) 
 
(La Fontaine 1994, p. 30) 
 
So, we are in familiar territory in many respects – truth, denial, or 
undecidability – issues which child protection workers and the courts struggle 
with every day  But in the period under discussion, the emergent claims in 
relation to both child sexual abuse and Satanic abuse were projected across 
the boundary of the professional practice system, beyond the remit of local 
judicial procedure or media debate, and were then subject to processes of 
very public national media, legal and research scrutiny. The Cleveland Inquiry 
itself, chaired by Justice Butler-Sloss, was obliged to engage at points with 
the deep philosophical issues to which I have alluded – what kind of thing 
actually exists in this area and how secure are our knowledge claims in 
relation to these phenomena – questions that philosophers would call 
‘ontological’ and ‘epistemological’ respectively. Satanic abuse was the subject 
of a commissioned and careful research study by, interestingly, a 
distinguished social anthropologist, Jean la Fontaine, who was in effect asked 
to settle similar questions – does this alleged phenomena exist and what 
evidence supports the conclusions reached. 
 
To establish and create social acceptance of new and disturbing social facts 
of this kind, and to arbitrate conclusively on the status of some closely related 
social fantasies, are considerable social achievements – assuming the correct 
judgements were reached. The next phase of public engagement with these 
issues was perhaps more concerned with meaning and its relationship to 
historical truth and/or fantasy.   
 
 
(c) Recovered memory 
 
Debate about ‘recovered memories’ of abuse surfaced in association with the 
events just recounted, as a kind of third phase of social engagement with the 
whole terrain. Historical details differ in different countries and the North 
American narrative varies from Britain, but in the latter the trajectory is 
roughly: Cleveland 1987-88, Satanic abuse (in Britain) 1990-1991, recovered 
memory 1992-5 with a significant conference on the subject organised by the 
Psychoanalysis Unit at University College London in 1994. The conceptual 
complexity of the recovered memory terrain is quite well summarised in the 
following diagram, taken from a chapter of the book reporting the proceedings 













Diagram 2 The relationship between true/false memories and ‘actual 
abuse 
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Before the recovery (of memory) we do not know whether there was or 
was not genuine abuse historically, so the supposedly unrecovered 
information is placed in a neutral position between a false negative and 
a true negative. The decision is what status to assign to it when it 
becomes described by the accuser as a genuine memory: is it a true-
positive memory or a false-positive memory? The crux of the argument 
is that the accusers and their therapists are claiming that a false 
negative becomes a true positive, whereas the False Memory Society 
parents – who insist on their innocence – are claiming that a true 
negative becomes a false positive. Both parties can be, and we must 
assume usually are, absolutely sincere. We cannot settle the matter by 
a show of hands, or even by a lie detector.  
 
(Weiskrantz, 1997, p.7) 
 
Drawing on psychological research into memory and memory recall, the same 
author concluded that ‘retrospective analysis of memory in relation to 
historical events without external corroboration is forever doomed to an 
uncertain conclusion’ (1994: 21) and a psychoanalyst commenting on this 
paper remarked that ‘Perhaps this is one of the hardest things for us – dealing 
with uncertainty, with having to tolerate not knowing, and not being able to 
clarify.’ (Trowell, 1997: 25)  
 
But the personal stakes are high, and people pursued certainty in many 
individual cases through the courts. In her book Hystories: Hysterical 
epidemics and modern culture, Elaine Showalter tells us that: 
 
 
True +   True – 
              
     
         
                                                    
            
 
False +   False - 
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By 1994 over three hundred cases involving repressed memory had 
been filed in the American courts. George Franklin was convicted of 
murder in 1990 and sentenced to life imprisonment when his daughter 
Eileen “remembered” seeing him kill a child in 1969 – a conviction 
overturned five years later when (the Judge) cited improprieties in the 




Once again, we are in territory broadly defined by the parameters of truth, 
denial, absolute or partial undecidability, and the tolerance or intolerance of 
uncertainty. Given this, it is something of a paradox in my account that all of 
the specific categories of controversy I have so far cited – child sexual abuse, 
Satanic ritual abuse, and the so-called memory wars that began with 
recovered memories of abuse, have largely subsided as a focus of public or 
indeed significant professional preoccupation. We accept the reality of, and 
continue the journey of individual and collective disclosure with respect to 
child sexual abuse; I am unaware of Satanic abuse as an element in any case 
coming to professional attention for many years; and the problem of memory 
and its relation to historical ‘truth’ has receded into the sequestered space of 
the consulting room where possibly we are all a little wiser for the intense 
contestation that occurred. On the other hand, intermittent public turmoil 
persists concerning those child abuse cases in which there is little or no 
ambiguity involved, because the child is dead, murdered, often following 
terrible torture.   
 
Put like this, it does not seem surprising that child abuse and protection 
become a focus of public concern from time to time. But it is the ‘time to time’ 
aspect of it that is in part perplexing. The most obvious, and widely accepted 
explanation for oscillation between public and media indifference and intense 
but short lived concern, is what could be termed the ‘failure’ hypothesis. 
Eruptions of public and media concern occur because, and only because, 
evidence of professional failures to prevent the preventable in these cases 
come to light. This is complicated territory – we know that in Britain about 50 
children a year die at the hands of their parents or immediate carers, and that 
many of these cases involve what could readily be (re)constructed as 
‘professional failures’, the now familiar recounting of ‘missed opportunities’ to 
intervene. But year on year, these cases, let alone the many more where 
children are severely injured, attract little or no pubic or national media 
attention. No ‘crisis’ ensues. Equally, other public services make mistakes that 
result in avoidable death – they even seek out and kill innocent people – but 
entire professions are not vilified in the public mind as a result. Who has 
heard of police officers or doctors (completely un-associated with the events 
in question) being spat at in the street, or where they are associated named 
and shamed on the front pages of national newspapers?  
 
So, it is tempting to think that the repetitious character of child death crises in 
Britain is mostly explained by a toxic blend of an intrusive and scandal hungry 
media, a weak social work profession, and occasional instances of egregious 
and repeated failures to protect vulnerable children. What receives less 
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attention is the idea that these crises are more directly associated with our 
response to children themselves, and the deaths of particular children, and 
their terrible suffering at the hands of adults of which we learn.    
 
(d) Child deaths 
 
There are different points at which this familiar narrative could be said to 
begin. I take the series of child deaths in the 1980s that became the subject of 
high profile public inquiries as a point of departure. Jasmine Beckford, 
Kimberley Carlisle, Tyra Henry. Everywhere, in the wake of each of these 
inquiries, procedures were tightening, volumes of new guidance and 
procedure being written, risk assessment protocols drafted. Such was the 
dominant policy response, one with which we are now so familiar that it is 
hard to imagine it could be different. The story continues through the 1990s 
and into our own decade; periods of relative calm and re-grouping when the 
work of child safeguarding professionals is mostly beneath the social radar, 
punctuated by dramatic explosions. Each time one of these eruptions occurs, 
government reacts to public outrage and panic by constructing a further set of 
rigid procedural or quasi-judicial defences, and projecting them back into the 
professional system, where they are at best ambivalently received, but never 
openly challenged. To a psychotherapist, they appear to be obsessional 
defences – a lot of ritual checking and re-checking, with an increasing 
uncertainty about what we are checking for (Cooper and Lees, 2014, 
forthcoming).  
   
The obsessional quality of the procedural solutions each inquiry mandates are 
a reaction characterised I suggest by a kind of excess rationality, a blind faith 
in the power of rules to manage and contain the social panic that exposure to 
the excessively painful and disturbing details of a child murder, and the 
proximity of someone who might have prevented it but did not, provokes in all 
of us. Would we have done better, or differently? The thought that we might 
not have done better is unbearable; the false conviction that we certainly 
would have done better, evokes triumph and rage. The result, the now familiar 
pronouncement that government will put in place measures to ensure that a 
dreadful tragedy like this ‘never happens again’.  
 
But it does keep happening – children continue to be murdered and from time 
to time news of one of these murders escapes the local professional domain 
where they are, as it were, routinely if very painfully assimilated, and a further 
public crisis ensues.  
 
Thus, Diagram 3 aims to show how recurrently, when controversy and anxiety 
associated with particular child deaths is propelled out of the realm of the 
formal child protection system, into the public domain (the jagged grey line 
represents the boundary), the findings and recommendations of enquiry 
processes are then propelled back into the official system. The overt task of 
the system is rendered more difficult, as a result of the ‘failure’ of the ‘covert’ 





The recurrent process of reinforcement of defences against child death 





























Mourning and its relationship to child death 
 
It was during the Victoria Climbié inquiry that it first occurred to me that the 
inquiry itself, culminating in the publication of the report, might constitute an 
unrecognised process of public mourning. To me it is striking how in every 
public inquiry process and accompanying media storm, the ordinary emotional 
registration of the death of the child is lost, or obscured behind the intense 
preoccupation with questions of blame, accountability, retribution, 
reconstruction of missed opportunities and so on. And yet, over the last three 
decades, the names of perhaps half a dozen of these same children have 
become inscribed in public memory and discourse, and the (to coin a phrase) 
often monumentally long and weighty reports of the inquiry into their deaths sit 
in every academic and many public libraries. Beyond, somewhere out of 
public reach are the memories of all the others who died similar deaths, but 
attained no such collective recognition. Like the tomb of the unknown soldier, 
does each of these inquiries and reports become the one that stands for the 
many?  
 
In his book The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia and Depression Darian 
Leader devotes much interesting space to the relationship between public and 
private mourning. I take this quote as just one of many possible useful points 
of departure:  
 
Most Western human beings in fact watch images of death 
every night in the TV shows about crime scene investigation and 
murder that fill up the evening programme schedule. It is 
amazing to realize that this is what most people do after work: 
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they watch programmes in which someone dies and whose 
death is subsequently explained and made sense of. The fact 
that this is reiterated endlessly suggests that death is ultimately 
not something that can be made sense of. And that the 
increasingly violent images multiply in the absence of a symbolic 
framework that might mediate them.  
 
(Leader, 2008:74)  
 
 
Do we possess a public symbolic framework to make sense of, mediate, child 
murder and torture in our society? I suspect not. The first part of this paper 
suggested that each eruption of new awareness in relation to child abuse – 
Cleveland, Satanic abuse, recovered memories - was succeeded by a 
process via which pubic institutions were engaged in an effort at some sort of 
‘sense making’, and that the evidence is these may have been broadly 
successful. The wearisome and professionally damaging repetition of 
eruptions over several decades with respect to child deaths suggests 
something else, but what? Darian Leader takes an observation of Melanie 
Klein’s about internal processes of mourning as the departure point for his 
discussion of the private-public relationship that he calls ‘a dialogue of 
mournings’:  
 
In the mourner’s state of mind, the feelings of his internal objects are 
also sorrowful. In his mind they share his grief in the same way as 
actual kind parents would. The poet tells us that “Nature mourns with 
the mourner”’ 
 
(Klein, 1940, p. 359) 
 
Contemporary controversies over the phenomenon of public mourning are 
telling here, says Leader. Critics of, say, the outbreak of public mourning at 
the death of Diana Princess of Wales, who characterised the public 
demonstrations of grief as cynical or inauthentic are missing the point. No-one 
really could seriously argue that these tears are (only) for the dead figure 
themselves. Rather, he says, ‘it is the public framework that allows people to 
articulate their own grief for other, unrelated losses…This is a basic function 
of public mourning rituals. The public facilitates the private’. (2008, p. 77) On 
this argument we could recognise the now widespread public practice of 
establishing temporary shrines at the site of a death or loss – road accidents 
for example – usually in the form of collections of flowers, as an effort to 
establish or re-establish a wider public symbolic framework for mourning than 
private burial rites allow.  
 
Darian Leader explores the many vicissitudes of the mourning process both 
intra-psychically, and socially, via the anthropology of mourning rituals in 
various societies. In some societies these rites entail a concrete re-ordering of 
social relationships in the community ‘After mourning and burial rites, social 
structures change, and formal rules govern the new set of ancestors to their 
descendants. The key is that the dead are installed in the ancestral line.’ To 
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achieve this, he argues that the dead must be killed a second time. ‘(F)or the 
living to feel safe and secure, the dead have to die twice. Real biological 
death is thus different from proper symbolic death.’ (2009, p. 116) We might 
think here both of the impulsive and reactive re-ordering of professional 
systems that usually follows inquiries, and of the inevitability, as we put it, that 
‘heads will roll’ somewhere in those same systems. Only then, at a public 
level, can the symbolic death be secured.  
 
The core thesis I have been outlining in this paper is that the social history of 
child abuse in Britain is about a gradual and episodic struggle to 
accommodate new and disturbing knowledge of ourselves, and along the way 
to better delineate reason from unreason. It involves a rather Hegelian idea of 
social science as the unfolding of society’s consciouness of itself. But if, as 
Leader suggests, we cannot ultimately make sense of actual death, are we 
condemned forever to repeat the history of our knowledge of child torture and 
death in the manner of Jasmine Beckford, Victoria Climbié and Peter 
Connelly? The view I am tentatively proposing suggests that our monuments 
to these children are in some respects a symbol of progress – it has taken 
repeated single cases to achieve it, but on this view no-one can any longer 
doubt it: child murder keeps happening; but the violent, unpredictable, 
primitive social processes that attend their installation suggests otherwise: 
child murder keeps happening but only because incompetent professionals 
take their eye off the ball.  
 
In the closing part of this section of the paper I propose that the notion of 
tragedy is the lost idea that might guide us towards the development of ‘a 
symbolic framework that mediates’ these eruptions.  
 
Tragedy – the unacceptable face of modernity 
 
Tragedy is an unfashionable idea, perhaps too associated with an attitude of 
complacency, of passivity in the face of ‘fate’. It has resonances of an old 
world, an old social and moral order, from a time before the optimism of 
reason declared that ‘there are no accidents’, we can subdue our monsters for 
ever, ensure it never happens again; and in which, as the sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman put it, ‘contingency, accident and fate are deeply resented’. 
 
And there are more than enough reasons for the consciousness of 
mortality to be traumatic. First and foremost, thinking about death 
defies thought itself...reason’s power is to be a guide to good choice, 
but death is not a matter of choice. Death is a scandal, the ultimate 
humiliation of reason.  
(Bauman, 1992, 14-15) 
 
 Tragic drama has been a key symbolic framework for mediating this fact. But 
the problem afflicting the great figures of tragic drama is not that their 
characters are ‘flawed’, but that they do not know themselves to be flawed - 
Lady Macbeth’s overweening ambition, Macbeth’s propensity to be bullied by 
her. If redemption arrives, it is in the form of self-knowledge, not the 
attainment of perfection: ‘I am a very foolish, fond old man’, says Lear ‘and to 
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deal plainly I fear I am not in my perfect mind,’ (Shakespeare, 1963, p. 161). 
‘Nobody dast blame this man. A salesman is got to dream, boy. It comes with 
the territory’, says one character at the graveside of Willy Loman in Arthur 
Miller’s Death of a Salesman (Miller, 1958, p.222). Of course, these 
reflections bring me to the troubling intersection between an account that 
seeks to look beyond the surface public discourses and practices that attend 
such grave matters as the murder of a child, and our social and professional 
need for those same discourses and practices. We may draw the line at 
murdering social workers, police officers or chief executives who are deemed 
to have failed in the course of their public duty – though an alarming 
proportion of the population seem inclined not to draw this line – but 
retrospectively based criticism or critical interrogation of their practices is the 
norm.  
 
But if nothing resembling the notion of ‘tragedy’ is available to mediate this 
pressure, the imperative towards production of a retrospective explanatory 
account that says ‘Events could or would have been otherwise if x had done 
y’, and therefore ‘x should have done y’ and so ‘The world should be 
otherwise than it is’ is irresistible. There is much more to say about this 
particular, and inadequate, line of epistemological reasoning. For example it 
seems to me to substitute a model of social reality as a closed and linear 
system, for one that is open and non-linear and in better accord with lived 
experience as an unfolding set of possibilities and choices. So here, we find 




The big problem for society (and consequently for professionals) is 
establishing a realistic expectation of professionals’ ability to predict the 
future and manage risk of harm to children and young people. Even 
when it is ascertained that abuse or neglect has occurred, there are 
difficult decisions to make about whether the parents can be helped to 
keep children safe from harm or whether the child needs to be 
removed. Such decisions involve making predictions about likely future 
harm and so are fallible. It may be judged highly unlikely that the child 
will be re-abused but low probability events happen. 
 
 
It is important to be aware how much hindsight distorts our judgment 
about the predictability of an adverse outcome. Once we know that the 
outcome was tragic, we look backwards from it and it seems clear 
which assessments or actions were critical in leading to that outcome. 
It is then easy to say in amazement ‘how could they not have seen x?’ 
or ‘how could they not have realised that x would lead to y?’ Even 
when we know the evidence on the hindsight bias, it is difficult to shift 
it; we still look back and over-estimate how visible the signs of danger 
were. The hindsight bias:  
 
‘oversimplifies or trivialises the situation confronting the practitioners 
and masks the processes affecting practitioner behaviour before-the-
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fact. Hindsight bias blocks our ability to see the deeper story of 
systematic factors that predictably shape human performance’ (Woods, 
D. et al. (2010), Behind Human Error, 2nd Edition, pp15, Farnham, Ashgate.)   
 
(Munro, 2011b, p.18, original emphasis)  
 
 
 Here I want principally to note that these frameworks of analysis also serve to 
eradicate the space of loss and mourning, a confrontation with the fact that 




Eileen Munro’s series of reports into child protection work in Britain are almost 
revolutionary, breaking a decades long mould of bureaucratic, conceptually 
linear and essentially positivist public policy interventions. Her aims went far 
beyond simply patching up the damaged state of the system and the social 
work profession following the Peter Connelly crisis, to embrace a fundamental 
change in cultural and political sensibilities. How successful she will prove to 
have been in these ambitious aims, it is still too early to adjudicate. The 
present paper does not set out to suggest that her analyses are in any way 
mistaken or misplaced, but it does propose that there are deeper, wider and 
more intangible forces at work in our society driving what has seemed like a 
‘repetition compulsion’ with respect to chid maltreatment scandal-making, and 
that we should be prepared for the fact that in British child protection work 
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